Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle — Book IV, Ambition, gentleness, good company

He is not prone to admiration, since nothing is great to him. He does not bear a grudge, for it is not a mark of greatness of soul to recall things against people, especially the wrongs they have done you, but rather to overlook them.

He is no gossip, for he will not talk either about himself or about another, as he neither wants to receive compliments nor to hear other people run down (nor is he lavish of praise either); and so he is not given to speaking evil himself, even of his enemies, except when he deliberately intends to give offence.

In troubles that cannot be avoided or trifling mishaps he will never cry out or ask for help, since to do so would imply that he took them to heart.

He likes to own beautiful and useless things, rather than useful things that bring in a return, since the former show his independence more.

Other traits generally attributed to the great-souled man are a slow gait, a deep voice, and a deliberate utterance; to speak in shrill tones and walk fast denotes an excitable and nervous temperament, which does not belong to one who cares for few things and thinks nothing great.

Such then being the Great-souled man, the corresponding character on the side of deficiency is the Small-souled man, and on that of excess the Vain man. These also are not thought to be actually vicious, since they do no harm, but rather mistaken. The small-souled man deprives himself of the good things that he deserves; and his failure to claim good things makes it seem that he has something bad about him and also that he does not know himself, for (people argue), if he deserved any good, he would try to obtain it. Not that such persons are considered foolish, but rather too retiring; yet this estimate of them is thought to make them still worse, for men’s ambitions show what they are worth, and if they hold aloof from noble enterprises and pursuits, and for go the good things of life, presumably they think they are not worthy of them.

The vain on the other hand are foolish persons, who are deficient in self-knowledge and expose their defect: they undertake honorable responsibilities of which they are not worthy, and then are found out. They are ostentatious in dress, manner and so on. They want people to know how well off they are, and talk about it, imagining that this will make them respected.

Smallness of Soul is more opposed than Vanity to Greatness of Soul, being both more prevalent and worse.

Greatness of Soul then, as we have said, is concerned with great honors.

^1125.2It appears however that honor also, as was said in the first part of this work, has a certain virtue concerned with it, which may be held to bear the same relation to Greatness of Soul that Liberality bears to Magnificence. This virtue as well as Liberality is without the element of greatness, but causes us to be rightly disposed towards moderate and small honors as Liberality does towards moderate and small amounts of money;

and just as there is a mean and also excess and deficiency in getting and in giving money, so also it is possible to pursue honor more or less than is right and also to seek it from the right source and in the right way.

We blame a man as ambitious if he seeks honor more than is right, or from wrong sources; we blame him as unambitious if he does not care about receiving honor even on noble grounds.

But at another time we praise the ambitious man as manly and a lover of what is noble, or praise the unambitious man as modest and temperate, as we said in the first part of this work. The fact is that the expression fond of so-and-so is ambiguous, and we do not always apply the word fond of honor (ambitious) to the same thing; when we use it as a term of praise, we mean more fond of honor than most men, but when as a reproach, more than is right. As the observance of the mean has no name, the two extremes dispute as it were for the unclaimed estate. But where there is excess and deficiency there must also be a mean.

Now men do seek honor both more and less than is right; it must therefore be possible also to do so rightly. It is therefore this nameless middle disposition in regard to honor that we really praise. Compared with ambition it appears unambitiousness, and compared with unambitiousness it appears ambition: compared with both, it a appears in a sense to be both.

This seems to be true of the other virtues also; but in the present case the extremes appear to be opposed only to one another, because the middle character has no name.

Gentleness is the observance of the mean in relation to anger. There is as a matter of fact no recognized name for the mean in this respect—indeed there can hardly be said to be names for the extremes either—, so we apply the word Gentleness to the mean though really it inclines to the side of the defect.

This has no name, but the excess may be called a sort of Irascibility, for the emotion concerned is anger, though the causes producing it are many and various.

Now we praise a man who feels anger on the right grounds and against the right persons, and also in the right manner and at the right moment and for the right length of time. He may then be called gentle-tempered, if we take gentleness to be a praiseworthy quality (for gentle really denotes a calm temper, not led by emotion but only becoming angry in such a manner, for such causes and for such a length of time as principle may ordain;

^1126.1although the quality is thought rather to err on the side of defect, since the gentle-tempered man is not prompt to seek redress for injuries, but rather inclined to forgive them).

The defect, on the other hand, call it a sort of Lack of Spirit or what not, is blamed; since those who do not get angry at things at which it is right to be angry are considered foolish, and so are those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the a right time, and with the right people.

It is thought that they do not feel or resent an injury, and that if a man is never angry he will not stand up for him self; and it is considered servile to put up with an insult to oneself or suffer one’s friends to be insulted.

Excess also is possible in each of these ways, for one can be angry with the wrong people, for wrong things, or more violently or more quickly or longer than is right; but not all these excesses of temper are found in the same person. This would be impossible, since evil destroys even itself, and when present in its entirety becomes unbearable.

There are then first the Irascible, who get angry quickly and with the wrong people and for the wrong things and too violently, but whose anger is soon over. This last is the best point in their character, and it is due to the fact that they do not keep their anger in, but being quick-tempered display it openly by retaliating, and then have done with it.

The excessively quick-tempered are Passionate; they fly into a passion at everything and on all occasions: hence their name.

The Bitter-tempered on the other hand are implacable, and remain angry a long time, because they keep their wrath in; whereas when a man retaliates there is an end of the matter: the pain of resentment is replaced by the pleasure of obtaining redress, and so his anger ceases. But if they do not retaliate, men continue to labour under a sense of resentment—for as their anger is concealed no one else tries to placate them either, and it takes a long time to digest one’s wrath within one. Bitterness is the most trouble some form of bad temper both to a man himself and to his nearest friends.

Those who lose their temper at the wrong things, and more and longer than they ought, and who refuse to be reconciled without obtaining redress or retaliating, we call Harsh-tempered.

We consider the excess to be more opposed to Gentleness than the defect, because it occurs more frequently, human nature being more prone to seek redress than to forgive; and because the harsh-tempered are worse to live with than the unduly placable.

But what was said above is also clear from what we are now saying; it is not easy to define in what manner and with whom and on what grounds and how long one ought to be angry, and up to what point one does right in so doing and where error begins. For he who transgresses the limit only a little is not held blameworthy, whether he errs on the side of excess or defect; in fact, we sometimes praise those deficient in anger and call them gentle-tempered, ^1126.2and we sometimes praise those who are harsh-tempered as manly, and fitted to command. It is therefore not easy to pronounce on principle what degree and manner of error is blameworthy, since this is a matter of the particular circumstances, and judgement rests with the faculty of perception.

But thus much at all events is clear, that the middle disposition is praiseworthy, which leads us to be angry with the right people for the right things in the right manner and so on, while the various forms of excess and defect are blameworthy—when of slight extent, but little so, when greater, more, and when extreme, very blameworthy indeed. It is clear therefore that we should strive to attain the middle disposition.

Let this be our account of the dispositions related to anger.

In society and the common life and intercourse of conversation and business, some men are considered to be Obsequious; these are people who complaisantly approve of everything and never raise objections, but think it a duty to avoid giving pain to those which whom they come in contact.

Those on the contrary who object to everything and do not care in the least what pain they cause, are called Surly or Quarrelsome.

Now it is clear that the dispositions described are blameworthy, and that the middle disposition between them is praiseworthy—that is, the tendency to acquiesce in the right things, and likewise to disapprove of the right things, in the right manner.

But to this no special name has been assigned, though it very closely resembles friendship; for he who exemplifies this middle disposition is the sort of man we mean by the expression a good friend, only that includes an element of affection.

It differs from friendship in not possessing the emotional factor of affection for one’s associates; since a man of this character takes everything in the right way not from personal liking or dislike, but from natural amiability. He will behave with the same propriety towards strangers and acquaintances alike, towards people with whom he is familiar and those with whom he is not—though preserving the shades of distinction proper to each class, since it is not appropriate to show the same regard or disregard for the feelings of friends and of strangers.

We have said then in general terms that he will behave in the right manner in society. We mean that in designing either to give pain or to contribute pleasure he will be guided by considerations of honor and of expediency.

For he seems to be concerned with pleasure and pain in social intercourse. He will disapprove of pleasures in which it is dishonorable or harmful to himself for him to join, preferring to give pain; and he will also disapprove of and refuse to acquiesce in a pleasure that brings any considerable discredit or harm to the agent, if his opposition will not cause much pain.

And he will comport himself differently with men of high position and with ordinary people, ^1127.1with persons more and less well known to him, and similarly as regards other distinctions, assigning to each class the proper degree of deference, and, other things apart, preferring to join in the pleasures of his companions and being reluctant to give pain; but being guided by the consequences, that is to say, the effects on his and his friends’ credit or interest, if these outweigh the pleasure he will give by compliance. Also he will give a small amount of pain at the moment for the sake of a large amount of pleasure in the future.

Such is the middle character, although it has no name. The man who always joins in the pleasures of his companions, if he sets out to be pleasant for no ulterior motive, is Obsequious; if he does so for the sake of getting something by it in the shape of money or money’s worth, he is a Flatterer. He that disapproves of everything is, as we said, Surly or Quarrelsome. As the mean has no name, the extremes appear to be opposite to each other.

The observance of the mean in relation to Boastfulness has to do with almost the same things. It also is without a name; but it will be as well to discuss these unnamed excellences with the rest, since we shall the better understand the nature of the moral character if we examine its qualities one by one; and we shall also confirm our belief that the virtues are modes of observing the mean, if we notice how this holds good in every instance. Now we have treated of behavior in Society with relation to giving pleasure and pain. Let us now discuss truthfulness and falsehood similarly displayed in word and deed, and in one’s personal pretensions.

As generally understood then, the boaster is a man who pretends to creditable qualities that he does not possess, or possesses in a lesser degree than he makes out,

while conversely the self depreciator disclaims or disparages good qualities that he does possess;

midway between them is the straightforward sort of man who is sincere both in behavior and in speech, and admits the truth about his own qualifications without either exaggeration or understatement.

Each of these things may be done with or without an ulterior motive; but when a man is acting without ulterior motive, his words, actions, and conduct always represent a his true character.

Falsehood is in itself base and reprehensible, and truth noble and praiseworthy; and similarly the sincere man who stands between the two extremes is praised, and the insincere of both kinds are blamed, more especially the boaster. Let us discuss each of the two, beginning with the truthful man.

We are speaking not of truthfulness in business relations, nor in matters where honesty and dishonesty are concerned ^1127.2(for these matters would come under a different virtue), but of cases where a man is truthful both in speech and conduct when no considerations of honesty come in, from an habitual sincerity of disposition.

Such sincerity may be esteemed a moral excellence; for the lover of truth, who is truthful even when nothing depends on it, will a fortiori be truthful when some interest is at stake, since having all along avoided falsehood for its own sake, he will assuredly avoid it when it is morally base; and this is a disposition that we praise.

The sincere man will diverge from the truth, if at all, in the direction of understatement rather than exaggeration; since this appears in better taste, as all excess is offensive.

The man who pretends to more merit than he possesses for no ulterior object seems, it is true, to be a person of inferior character, since otherwise he would not take pleasure in falsehood; but he appears to be more foolish than vicious.

When, on the other hand, a man exaggerates his own merits to gain some object, if that object is glory or honor he is not very much to be blamed as is the boaster, but if he boasts to get money or things that fetch money, this is more unseemly.

(Boastfulness is not a matter of potential capacity but of deliberate purpose; a man is a boaster if he has a fixed disposition to boast—a boastful character.) Similarly liars are divided into those who like lying for its own sake and those who lie to get reputation or profit.

Those then who boast for the sake of reputation pretend to possess such qualities as are praised and admired; those who do so for profit pretend to accomplishments that are useful to their fellows and also can be counterfeited without detection; for instance, proficiency in prophecy, philosophy, or medicine. Because these arts have the two qualities specified they are the commonest fields of pretence and bragging.

Self-depreciators, who understate their own merits, seem of a more refined character, for we feel that the motive underlying this form of insincerity is not gain but dislike of ostentation. These also mostly disown qualities held in high esteem, as Socrates used to do.

Those who disclaim merely trifling or obvious distinctions are called affected humbugs, and are decidedly contemptible; and sometimes such mock humility seems to be really boastfulness, like the dress of the Spartans, for extreme negligence in dress, as well as excessive attention to it, has a touch of ostentation.

But a moderate use of self-depreciation in matters not too commonplace and obvious has a not ungraceful air.

The boaster seems to be the opposite of the sincere man, because Boastfulness is worse than Self-depreciation.

But life also includes relaxation, and one form of relaxation is playful conversation. Here, too, we feel that there is a certain standard of good taste in social behavior, ^1128.1and a certain propriety in the sort of things we say and in our manner of saying them, and also in the sort of things we allow to be said to us; and it will also concern us whether those in whose company we speak or to whom we listen conform to the same rules of propriety.

And it is clear that in these matters too it is possible either to exceed or to fall short of the mean.

Those then who go to excess in ridicule are thought to be buffoons and vulgar fellows, who itch to have their joke at all costs, and are more concerned to raise a laugh than to keep within the bounds of decorum and avoid giving pain to the object of their raillery. Those on the other hand who never by any chance say anything funny themselves and take offence at those who do, are considered boorish and morose. Those who jest with good taste are called witty or versatile—that is to say, full of good turns; for such sallies seem to spring from the character, and we judge men’s characters, like their bodies, by their movements.

But as matter for ridicule is always ready to hand, and as most men are only too fond of fun and raillery, even buffoons are called witty and pass for clever fellows; though it is clear from what has been said that Wit is different, and widely different, from Buffoonery.

The middle disposition is further characterized by the quality of tact, the possessor of which will say, and allow to be said to him, only the sort of things that are suitable to a virtuous man and a gentleman: since there is a certain propriety in what such a man will say and hear in jest, and the jesting of a gentleman differs from that of a person of servile nature, as does that of an educated from that of an uneducated man.

The difference may be seen by comparing the old and the modern comedies; the earlier dramatists found their fun in obscenity, the moderns prefer innuendo, which marks a great advance in decorum.

Can we then define proper raillery by saying that its jests are never unbecoming to gentlemen, or that it avoids giving pain or indeed actually gives pleasure to its object? Or is it impossible to define anything so elusive? for tastes differ as to what is offensive and what amusing.

Whatever rule we lay down, the same will apply to the things that a man should allow to be said to him, since we feel that deeds which a man permits to be ascribed to him he would not stop at actually doing.

Hence a man will draw the line at some jokes; for raillery is a sort of vilification, and some forms of vilification are forbidden by law; perhaps some forms of raillery ought to be prohibited also.

The cultivated gentleman will therefore regulate his wit, and will be as it were a law to himself.

Such then is the middle character, whether he be called tactful or witty. The buffoon is one who cannot resist a joke; he will not keep his tongue off himself or anyone else, if he can raise a laugh, and will say things ^1128.2which a man of refinement would never say, and some of which he would not even allow to be said to him. The boor is of no use in playful conversation: he contributes nothing and takes offence at everything;

yet relaxation and amusement seem to be a necessary element in life.

We have now discussed three modes of observing the mean in our behavior, all of which are concerned with conversation or with common occupations of some sort. They differ in that one is concerned with truthfulness and the others with being pleasant. Of the two that deal with pleasure, one is displayed in our amusements, and the other in the general intercourse of life.

Modesty cannot properly be described as a virtue, for it seems to be a feeling rather than a disposition;

at least it is defined as a kind of fear of disrepute, and indeed in its effects it is akin to the fear of danger; for people who are ashamed blush, while those in fear of their lives turn pale; both therefore appear to be in a sense bodily affections, and this indicates a feeling rather than a disposition.

The feeling of modesty is not suitable to every age, but only to the young. We think it proper for the young to be modest, because as they live by feeling they often err, and modesty may keep them in check; and we praise young people when they are modest, though no one would praise an older man for being shamefaced, since we think he ought not to do anything of which he need be ashamed.

For indeed the virtuous man does not feel shame, if shame is the feeling caused by base actions;

since one ought not to do base actions (the distinction between acts really shameful and those reputed to be so is immaterial, since one ought not to do either), and so one never ought to feel shame.

Shame is a mark of a base man, and springs from a character capable of doing a shameful act. And it is absurd that, because a man is of such a nature that he is ashamed if he does a shameful act, he should therefore think himself virtuous, since actions to cause shame must be voluntary, but a virtuous man will never voluntarily do a base action.

Modesty can only be virtuous conditionally—in the sense that a good man would be ashamed if he were to do so and so; but the virtues are not conditional. And though shamelessness and not shrinking from shameful actions is base, this does not prove that to be ashamed when one a does shameful acts is virtuous—

any more than Self-restraint is a virtue, and not rather a mixture of virtue and vice. But this will be explained later. Let us now speak of Justice.