Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle — Book VII, The nature of pleasure

There is also a resemblance between the unrestrained man and the profligate, though they are really distinct: both pursue bodily pleasures, but the profligate thinks it right to do so, the man who lacks self-restraint does not.

Again, the same person cannot be at once unrestrained and prudent, for it has been shown that Prudence is inseparable from Moral Virtue.

Also, Prudence does not consist only in knowing what is right, but also in doing it; but the unrestrained man does not do the right. (Cleverness on the other hand is not incompatible with Unrestraint—which is why it is sometimes thought that some people are prudent and yet unrestrained—because Cleverness differs from Prudence in the manner explained in our first discourse: as being intellectual faculties they are closely akin, but they differ in that Prudence involves deliberate choice.)

Nor indeed does the unrestrained man even know the right in the sense of one who consciously exercises his knowledge, but only as a man asleep or drunk can be said to know something. Also, although he errs willingly (for he knows in a sense both what he is doing and what end he is aiming at), yet he is not wicked, for his moral choice is sound, so that he is only half-wicked. And he is not unjust, for he does not deliberately design to do harm, since the one type of unrestrained person does not keep to the resolve he has formed after deliberation, and the other, the excitable type, does not deliberate at all. In fact the unrestrained man resembles a state which passes all the proper enactments, and has good laws, but which never keeps its laws: the condition of things satirized by Anaxandrides— The state, that recks not of the laws, would fain..

whereas the bad man is like a state which keeps its laws but whose laws are bad.

Both Self-restraint and Unrestraint are a matter of extremes as compared with the character of the mass of mankind; the restrained man shows more and the unrestrained man less steadfastness than most men are capable of.

Reformation is more possible with that type of Unrestraint which is displayed by persons of an excitable temperament than it is with those who deliberate as to what they ought to do, but do not keep to the resolution they form. And those who have become unrestrained through habit are more easily cured than those who are unrestrained by nature, since habit is easier to change than nature; for even habit is hard to change, precisely because it is a sort of nature, as Evenus says: Mark me, my friend, ’tis long-continued training, And training in the end becomes men’s nature.

We have now discussed the nature of Self-restraint and Unrestraint, and of Endurance and Softness, and have shown how these dispositions are related to one another.

^1152.2It is also the business of the political philosopher to examine the nature of Pleasure and Pain; for he is the master-craftsman, and lays down the end which is the standard whereby we pronounce things good or bad in the absolute sense.

Moreover this investigation is fundamental for our study, because we have established that Moral Virtue and Vice are concerned with pleasures and pains, and most people hold that pleasure is a necessary adjunct of Happiness, which is why the word denoting supreme bliss is derived from the verb meaning to enjoy.

Now (1) some people think that no pleasure is a good thing, whether essentially or accidentally. They argue that Good and Pleasure are two distinct things.

(2) Others hold that though some pleasures are good, most are bad.

(3) There is also a third view, that even if all pleasures are good, nevertheless pleasure cannot be the Supreme Good.

(1) To prove that pleasure is not a good at all, it is argued that (a) Every pleasure is a conscious process towards a natural state; but a process can in no case belong to the same order of things as its end; for example, the process of building cannot be a thing of the same sort as the house built. (b) The temperate man avoids pleasures. (c) The prudent man pursues freedom from pain, not pleasure. (d) Pleasures are a hindrance to prudent deliberation, and the more so the more enjoyable they are; for instance, sexual pleasure: no one could think of anything while indulging in it. (e) There is no art of pleasure; yet with every good thing there is an art which produces it. (f) Children and animals pursue pleasures.

(2) To prove that not all pleasures are good, it is argued that (a) Some pleasures are disgraceful, and discredit the man who indulges in them. (b) Some pleasures are harmful, for certain pleasant things cause disease.

(3) To prove that pleasure is not the Supreme Good, it is argued that it is not an end but a process.

These then, more or less, are the current views.

But the following considerations will show that these arguments are not conclusive to prove (1) that pleasure is not a good at all, nor (3) that it is not the Supreme Good.

(1) (a) In the first place (i.) the good has two meanings: it means both that which is good absolutely, and that which is good for somebody, or relatively. Consequently the term good has the same double meaning when applied to men’s natures and dispositions; and therefore also when applied to movements and to processes. Also those processes which are thought to be bad will in some cases, though bad absolutely, be not bad relatively, but in fact desirable for a particular person, or in other cases, though not even desirable generally for the particular person, nevertheless desirable for him in particular circumstances and for a short time, although not really desirable. And some such processes are not really pleasures at all, but only seem to be so: I mean the painful processes that are undergone for their curative effects, for instance, treatment applied to the sick.

Again (ii.), the good is either an activity or a state. Now the pleasures that restore us to our natural state are only accidentally pleasant; while the activity of desire is the activity of that part of us which has remained in the natural state: for that matter, there are some pleasures which do not involve pain or desire at all ^1153.1(for instance, the pleasure of contemplation), being experienced without any deficiency from the normal having occurred. That restorative pleasures are only accidentally pleasant is indicated by the fact that we do not enjoy the same things while the natural state is being replenished as we do after it has been restored to the normal; in the normal state we enjoy things that are absolutely pleasant, but during the process of replenishment we enjoy even their opposites; for instance, sour and bitter things, none of which are naturally or absolutely pleasant, so that the pleasures we get from them are not naturally or absolutely pleasant either, since there is the same distinction between various pleasures as there is between the pleasant things from which they arise.

Again (iii.), it does not follow, as some argue, that as the end is better than the process towards it, so there must be something better than pleasure. For pleasures are not really processes, nor are they all incidental to a process: they are activities, and therefore an end; nor do they result from the process of acquiring our faculties, but from their exercise; nor have they all of them some end other than themselves: this is only true of the pleasures of progress towards the perfection of our nature. Hence it is not correct to define pleasure as a conscious process; the term should rather be activity of our natural state, and for conscious we must substitute unimpeded. Some thinkers hold that pleasure is a process on the ground that it is good in the fullest sense, because in their view an activity is a process; but really an activity is different from a process.

To argue (2) (b) that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are detrimental to health is the same as to argue that health is bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket. Both pleasant things and healthy things can be bad in a relative sense, but that does not make them really bad; even contemplation may on occasion be injurious to health.

(1) (d) Neither prudence nor any other quality is hampered by its own pleasure, but only by alien pleasures; the pleasures of contemplation and study will enable us to contemplate and study better.

(1) (e) That there should be no art devoted to the production of any form of pleasure is only natural; an art never produces an activity, but the capacity for an activity. Though in point of fact the arts of perfumery and cookery are generally considered to be arts of pleasure.

The arguments (1) (b) that the temperate man avoids pleasure, and (1) (c) that the prudent man pursues freedom from pain, and (1) (f) that animals and children pursue pleasure, are all met by the same reply. It has been explained how some pleasures are absolutely good, and how not all pleasures are good. Now it is those pleasures which are not absolutely good that both animals and children pursue, and it is freedom from pain arising from the want of those pleasures that the prudent man pursues: that is, the pleasures that involve desire and pain, namely the bodily pleasures (for these are of that nature), or their excessive forms, in regard to which Profligacy is displayed. That is why the temperate man avoids excessive bodily pleasures: for even the temperate man has pleasures.

^1153.2That pain moreover is an evil and to be avoided is admitted; since all pain is either absolutely evil, or evil as being some way an impediment to activity. But that which is the opposite of something to be avoided—opposed to it as a thing to be avoided and evil—must be good. It follows therefore that pleasure is a good. Speusippus attempted to refute this argument by saying that, as the greater is opposed to the equal as well as to the less, so pleasure is opposed to a neutral state of feeling as well as to pain. But this refutation does not hold good; for Speusippus would not maintain that pleasure is essentially evil.

But granting (2) that some pleasures are bad, it does not therefore follow (3) that a certain pleasure may not nevertheless be the Supreme Good; just as a certain form of knowledge may be supremely good, although some forms of knowledge are bad. On the contrary (i) since every faculty has its unimpeded activity, the activity of all the faculties, or of one of them (whichever constitutes Happiness), when unimpeded, must probably be the most desirable thing there is; but an unimpeded activity is a pleasure; so that on this showing the Supreme Good will be a particular kind of pleasure, even though most pleasures are bad, and, it may be, bad absolutely. This is why everybody thinks that the happy life must be a pleasant life, and regards pleasure as a necessary ingredient of happiness; and with good reason, since no impeded activity is perfect, whereas Happiness is essentially perfect; so that the happy man requires in addition the goods of the body, external goods and the gifts of fortune, in order that his activity may not be impeded through lack of them.

(Consequently those who say that, if a man be good, he will be happy even when on the rack, or when fallen into the direst misfortune, are intentionally or unintentionally talking nonsense.)

But because Happiness requires the gifts of fortune in addition, some people think that it is the same thing as good fortune; but this is not so, since even good fortune itself when excessive is an impediment to activity, and perhaps indeed no longer deserves to be called good fortune, since good fortune can only be defined in relation to Happiness.

(ii.) Moreover, that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure is some indication that it is in a sense the Supreme Good: No rumor noised abroad by many peoples Comes utterly to naught.

But they do not all pursue the same pleasure, since the natural state and the best state neither is nor seems to be the same for them all; yet still they all pursue pleasure. Indeed it is possible that in reality they do not pursue the pleasure which they think and would say they do, but all the same pleasure; for nature has implanted in all things something divine. But as the pleasures of the body are the ones which we most often meet with, and as all men are capable of these, these have usurped the family title; and so men think these are the only pleasures that exist, because they are the only ones which they know.

^1154.1(iii.) Moreover, it is clear that if pleasure is not good and activity is not pleasure, the life of the happy man will not necessarily be pleasant. For why should he need pleasure if it is not good? On the contrary, his life may even be painful; for if pleasure is neither good nor evil, no more is pain either, so why should he avoid it? And if the good man’s activities are not pleasanter than those of others, his life will not be pleasanter either.

On the subject of the bodily pleasures, we must examine the view of those who say that though it is true that some pleasures, which they call the noble pleasures, are highly desirable, yet bodily pleasures and those which are the objects of the profligate are not desirable.

If so, why are the pains opposed to them evil? since the opposite of evil is good. Perhaps the true view is, that the necessary pleasures are good in the sense that what is not evil is good; or that they are good up to a point: for though you cannot have excessive pleasure from states and movements which cannot themselves be in excess of what is good, you can have excessive pleasure from those which themselves admit of excess. Now you can have an excess of the bodily goods; and it is pursuing this excess that makes a bad man, not pursuing the necessary pleasures, for everybody enjoys savory food, wine, and sexual pleasure in some degree, though not everybody to the right degree. With pain it is the other way about: one avoids not merely excessive pain, but all pain; for the opposite of excessive pleasure is not pain at all, except to the man who pursues excessive pleasure.

We ought however not only to state the true view, but also to account for the false one, since to do so helps to confirm the true; for when we have found a probable explanation why something appears to be true though it is not true, this increases our belief in the truth.

We have then to explain why it is that bodily pleasures appear to be more desirable than others.

(1) Now the first reason is that pleasure drives out pain; and excessive pain leads men to seek excessive pleasure, and bodily pleasure generally, as a restorative. And these restorative pleasures are intense, and therefore sought for, because they are seen in contrast with their opposite. (The view that pleasure is not a good at all is also due to these two facts, as has been said, (a) that some pleasures are actions indicative of an evil nature, whether it be depraved from birth, like the nature of an animal, or corrupted by habit, as is the case with evil men, and (b) that others are restoratives of a defective state, and to be in the natural state is better than to be in process of returning to it. ^1154.2But as a matter of fact the latter sort of pleasures accompany a process towards perfection, so that accidentally they are good.)

(2) Another reason is that bodily pleasures are sought for, just because of their intensity, by people who are incapable of enjoying others (for instance, some deliberately take steps to make themselves thirsty): not that there is any objection to this if the pleasures are innocuous, but it is bad if they are productive of harmful results. The fact is that some men have no other sources of enjoyment; and also many are so constituted that a neutral state of feeling is to them positively painful. (This is because a state of strain is the normal condition of an animal organism, as physiology testifies; it tells us that sight and hearing are in fact painful, but we have got used to them in course of time—such is the theory.)

Similarly the young are in a condition resembling intoxication, because they are growing, and youth is pleasant in itself; but persons of an excitable nature need a restorative perpetually, because their temperament keeps their bodies in a constant state of irritation, and their appetites are continually active; and any pleasure, if strong, drives out pain, not only the opposite pleasure. This is why excitable men become profligate and vicious.

Pleasures unaccompanied by pain, on the other hand—and these are those derived from things naturally and not accidentally pleasant—do not admit of excess. By things accidentally pleasant I mean things taken as restoratives; really their restorative effect is produced by the operation of that part of the system which has remained sound, and hence the remedy itself is thought to be pleasant. Those things on the contrary are naturally pleasant which stimulate the activity of a given nature.

Nothing however can continue to give us pleasure always, because our nature is not simple, but contains a second element (which is what makes us perishable beings), and consequently, whenever one of these two elements is active, its activity runs counter to the nature of the other, while when the two are balanced, their action feels neither painful nor pleasant. Since if any man had a simple nature, the same activity would afford him the greatest pleasure always. Hence God enjoys a single simple pleasure perpetually. For there is not only an activity of motion: but also an activity of immobility, and there is essentially a truer pleasure in rest than in motion. But change in all things is sweet, as the poet says, owing to some badness in us; since just as a changeable man is bad, so also is a nature that needs change; for it is not simple nor good.

We have now discussed the nature of Self-restraint and Unrestraint, and of Pleasure and Pain, and have shown in either case in what sense one of the two is good and the other evil. It remains for us to speak of Friendship.